In the third quarter of 2026, Russia’s Ministry of Finance was able to place OFZ bonds worth only RUB 10.4 billion against a planned RUB 1.5 trillion that is USD 127 mn (at an exchange rate of RUB 82 per USD), this is a small amount raised against a quarterly plan of USD 18.3 billion. 14 auction days were scheduled and only one auction took place, on 1 July at 14.96% interest and nothing happened since 20 July.
Even the floating-rate 29028 issue failed despite a floating-coupon bond carries no interest-rate risk for the buyer. No bids were submitted (at the price the Ministry was willing to tolerate) = the offered price was not tolerated by the market. While formally, though, it is a failure of both side, actually, only one of them matters for this case. This fact alone does not mean that Russia cannot borrow any longer. Of course, it still can but at a higher interest (to reflect a rising risk), but it was decided not to offer such higher interest.
This fact also does not mean that the channel has been exhausted and the proof is the fact that on 23 July, the Ministry registered RUB 1.5 trillion (USD 18.3 billion) of floating-rate OFZ bonds. And just 5 days later it secured their inclusion in the higher listing tier with nothing happened after that: it was not activated = forced absorption by banks has been prepared for the future action. Logically, since everyone interested saw it, a mechanism that has been prepared but not used has already been spent as a political resource that is a different signal and it’s not the same as keeping it in reserve.
Of course, one of the main reasons is the State Duma elections that will take place on 20 September, so it’s also not so much about market, this pause should end after them (plus several weeks for Duma to make certain decisions) if it was only electoral. It is about market although in the aspect of the price of the bonds and signals that can be sent and decided not to be sent before elections.
Forecast: the third-quarter plan will not be fulfilled to 70% or better, and auctions of fixed-coupon issues will not have resumed before 31 October 2026 – the date that is both: after the elections and after publication of the borrowing plan for the 4th quarter.
Another interesting fact that is strongly adjacent to the one above: H1’26 federal debt servicing is 10.3% of budget revenues: at the first glance, it simply looks better than planned, but it is better than planned because the market is closed: placements that do not happen do not create coupon obligations. It signals the opposite reading of both signals: this indicator improves as the backbone situation underneath it deteriorates. Of course, if the value is measured against GDP rather than revenue (as it is usually done), that understates the burden 3-4 times, but the payment can be made only from revenue not from GDP. And there are multiple cases when with higher debt-to-GDP the burden-to-revenue is much lower than Russia has.
Another important aspect: while the federal budget is one accounting perimeter; the obligation lies across the entire system. Across the federal centre, regions, funds, systemically important state-owned companies, the defence industry and the social sector, the total requirement for 2026 amounts to RUB 16.1 trillion (USD 196 billion): 40% of federal budget revenues and about 96% of everything budgeted for defence and domestic security combined. A region that cannot pay a contractor; a defence plant whose bank refuses to roll over working capital; an unpaid salary: these are three different paths (and evolving simultaneously) to the same failure, and all of them are financed from the same rubles and for all of them obligation falls on the state (to finance them no matter what). Such requirement has been met so far. What the panel measures is by what means and at whose expense.
The particularities of the situation discussed above are some of the reasons why the panel at https://incidence.world was created. And this Incidence Notes channel will contain: 1) panel updates (at approximately monthly cadence), 2) verification of the author’s forecasts (upon checkpoint dates), 3) important updates to the ladders progress (for 4 important ladders of the panel), and notes on rapidly evolving mechanisms (one post about a rapidly evolving mechanism accelerated yesterday by Putin’s decree will be published in a day or two).
The next update of the Incidence panel is planned to be done and released after the 20 September elections. A separate post with a verification of the Forecast above will be done after 31 October, and regardless of the outcome. Findings that contradict forecasts and arguments will be published first, this rule applies both to the panel and to this resource.
The panel: incidence.world. Version 1.9, data as of 21 August 2026, in English, Ukrainian and Russian.
CC BY 4.0 · DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22068421