Release 3.0 of the panel Limits of Russia’s endurance in a war of attrition is out at incidence.world, in English, Ukrainian and Russian, with data as of 25 October 2026. It asks where the Kremlin finds the money for each next move, and how many moves are left.
The numbers
The war bill above revenue: ₽16.9 trn in 2026 (42% of federal revenue) and ₽23 trn in 2027 (56%). Each year that is more than the whole National Defence line: 131% and 134%.
What has a source: of the 2026 bill, ₽13.5 trn is found or findable and ₽3.4 trn is not. In 2027 the part without a source grows to ₽8.5 trn.
Outside the market: 53% of spending above revenue in January to September was paid for by money that did not come from voluntary lenders.
Conversion: 10 of 14 known mechanisms are in use, 3 of them partly.
The ceiling: new money for the state perimeter in 2026 is ₽8.5 to 8.9 trn, 85 to 89% of the lower bound of the inflation-tax ceiling (₽10 to 13 trn). Beyond it, printing stops buying the war.
Who pays for the next move?
The Treasury’s own balances are spent. The voluntary bond market is closed at the current key rate: in September systemically important banks bought 73.6% of placements, and the 30 September auction failed. In the third quarter 74% of borrowing went through floaters, and all of it was paid for by growth in central bank claims on banks. The banking system has been in a liquidity deficit since 27 February.
That is why widget 3.1, money printing through banks, turned red in this release: all three facts of the printing chain are now met. Perceived inflation stands at 15.1%, 2.9 points below the red rung.
At the front the arithmetic runs the same way. In September losses were 55% above recruitment, and the permanently lost, about 38,000, exceeded recruitment by 27%. Russia lost ground that month: 80.8 km² by ISW.
What is new in 3.0
A new structure. The headline is the funding gap, its price in inflation and the coupling between them. Below it, three groups: the funding gap, inflation, front and rear. New sections explain how the war can stop, what the regime can still pay with, the vicious cycles and the approach to the limit.
New widgets on the tax take against a shrinking base (+28% on 2021), coercion instead of money, capital flight, liquid reserves (3.7 months of imports; the liquid part of the NWF alone 1.3 months, against 4.0 at the start of the war), flight to cash, deposits net of interest, losses by type of ruble holder, the territory ladder and fuel.
A correction. Debt service was shown as 10.3% of revenue. That was an error, a 2026 numerator over a 2025 denominator. The right figure is 9.7%, green.
Companions: the Breaking Point 2027 scenario model, an Excel calculator of permanent losses, a PDF of the full panel and a two-page short version.
When will money printing stop paying for the war?
The panel counts how much money the Kremlin needs. Its companion, the Breaking Point 2027 model, shows what printing that money costs in prices. Starting from the panel’s ₽17.7 trn of new money for 2027, it runs six scenarios. In the base case, the Kremlin carrying on as now, perceived inflation reaches 34% by December 2027 and crosses into the turning point in July. With stronger Ukrainian strikes it reaches 41.8%. See the 2027 scenarios or test your own by changing the parameters.